

Table 1
Proven Oil Reserves in the World and the Caspian

	Billion barrels	Billion tons	percent
Middle East	654.0	89.6	59.7
North America	87.7	12.0	8.0
Latin America	68.0	9.3	6.2
Africa	56.9	7.8	5.2
Asia	45.1	6.2	4.1
Europe (w/o CIS)	18.5	2.5	1.7
CIS. including	165.5	22.7	15.1
Russia	136.5	18.7	12.5
Caspian Region	29.0	4.0	2.6
Total	1095.7	150.1	100.0

Source: International Petroleum Encyclopedia. 1996.

Table 2
Oil and Gas Resources of the states of the Caspian Region according to the Estimates of the US Energy Information Administration

Countries, Units of Measurement	Oil			Gas			Oil+Gas		
	Proven Reserves	Possible Resources	Total	Proven Resources	Possible Resources	Total	Proven Resources	Possible resources	Total
AZERBAIJAN									
Billion Barrels Trillion cf.	3.6-11.0	27	31-38	11	35	46			
Bln tons coal equivalent	0.7-2.2	5.4	6.1-7.6	0.4	1.3	1.7	1.1-2.6	6.7	7.8-9.3
IRAN (*)									
Billion barrels Trillion cf	0	12	12	0	11	11			
Bln tons coal equivalent	0	2.4	2.4	0	0.4	0.4	0	2.8	2.8
KAZAKHSTAN									
Billion barrels Trillion cf	10.0-16.0	85	95-101	53-83	88	141-171			
Bln tons coal equivalent	2.0-3.2	17	19.0-20.2	2.0-3.1	3.3	5.3-6.4	4.0-6.3	20.3	24.3-26.6
RUSSIA (*)									
Billion barrels Trillion cf	0.2	5	5	-	-	-			
Bln tons coal equivalent	0.04	1.0	1.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
TURKMENISTAN									
Billion barrels Trillion cf	1.4-1.5	32	34	98-155	159	257-314			
Bln tons coal equivalent	0.3-0.3	6.4	6.7	3.7-5.8	5.9	9.6-11.7	4.0-6.1	12.3	16.3-18.4
TOTAL FOR CASPIAN REGION COUNTRIES									
Billion barrels Trillion cf	15.2-28.7	161	176.2-189.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bln tons coal equivalent	3.0-5.7	32.2	35.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL FOR CASPIAN REGION COUNTRIES (excluding Russia)									
Billion barrels Trillion cf	15.0-28.5	156	171-184.5	162-249	293	455-542	177-278	449	626-727
Bln tons coal equivalent	3.0-5.7	31.2	34.2-36.9	6.1-9.3	10.9	17.0-20.2	9.1-15.0	42.1	51.1-57.1

(*) Caspian territories only

Table 3.
Consolidated information on estimated oil and gas resources for main options for the division of Caspian Sea bottom (Category D1, average values, billion tons coal equivalent)–evaluation of the RF Ministry of Natural Resources

States	Option 1		Option 2	Option 3	Option 4	Option 5
	Level -26 m	Level -27 m				
Azerbaijan	3.7	3.7	4.0	3.7	3.7	3.7
Iran	1.0	1.0	2.6	1.0	1.0	1.0
Kazakhstan	9.0	8.0	4.5	4.1	6.2	6.1
Russia	2.2	2.1	2.6	4.1	2.6	2.7
Turkmenia	2.2	2.2	2.6	2.1	2.2	2.2
Total Caspian States	18.1	17.0	16.3	15.0	15.7	15.7

Shown in different fonts: **Maximum estimates, minimum estimates**

Option 1: Oil and gas resources of the Caspian Sea are divided between the Caspian States on the basis of sectoral delimitation of offshore areas using the median line principle. In the conditional Russian-Kazakh sector this sectoral division (different options of the median line) is done proceeding from the three values of the Caspian Sea level.

Option 2: Oil and gas resources of the Caspian Sea are divided between the five Caspian States based on the principle of a 10-mile zone of national jurisdiction and equal access of all Caspian states to the resources of the Caspian international area.

Option 3: Oil and gas resources of the Caspian Sea in the conditional Russian-Kazakh sector are divided between Russia and Kazakhstan on the basis of equal object for both countries.

Option 4: Oil and gas resources of the Caspian Sea are divided between Russia and Kazakhstan on the basis of the bottom delimitation line defined by Order 1514 of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Kazakhstan of December 10, 1996.

Option 5: Oil and gas resources of the Caspian Sea in the conditional Russian-Kazakh sector are divided on the basis of drawing a “pragmatic” line defined in such a way as to avoid crossing the structures already allocated and to leave to Russia the section of the bottom where the tender was already held in the fall of 1997 for Russian legal entities.

Table 4.
Incremental oil demand in the Eastern Hemisphere (as compared to 1995)

	2000	2005	2010	2015
Europe (w/o CIS)				
Consumption growth in Europe	30	54	79	109
Change in Europe's own production	0	-30	-80	-130
Net incremental demand in Europe	30	84	159	239
Asia				
Incremental consumption in Asia	153	357	535	748
Change in own production in Asia	-15	-25	-40	-45
Net incremental demand in Asia	168	382	575	793

Calculated on the basis of: OECD World Energy Outlook, 1996

Table 5.

Four scenarios of demand and supply of Caspian oil on the markets of the Eastern Hemisphere, 1995-2015, million tons per annum

Table 5-1. Scenario 1 ("Western")									
SUPPLIES TO EUROPE									
	Incremental demand (by 1995)	Increment w/own production	Azerbaijan	Kazakhstan	Russia (Timan-Pechora)	Iraq	Total	Deficit(-)/ Surplus(+)	
2000	30,00	30,00	11,00	5,00	0,00	40,00	56,00	26,00	
2005	54,00	84,00	44,00	28,20	18,00	60,00	150,20	66,20	
2010	79,00	159,00	64,00	38,00	43,00	80,00	225,00	66,00	
2015	109,00	239,00	52,00	67,00	16,00	80,00	215,00	-24,00	
SUPPLIES TO ASIA									
	Incremental demand (by 1995)	Increment w/own production	Azerbaijan	Kazakhstan	Russia (Sakhalin 1 and 2)	Iraq	Total	Deficit(-)/ Surplus(+)	
2000	153,00	168,00	0,00	0,00	5,00	0,00	5,00	-163,00	
2005	357,00	382,00	0,00	0,00	36,00	60,00	96,00	-286,00	
2010	535,00	575,00	0,00	0,00	16,00	120,00	136,00	-439,00	
2015	748,00	793,00	0,00	0,00	8,00	220,00	228,00	-565,00	

Table 5-2.
Scenario 2 ("Eastern")

SUPPLIES TO EUROPE								
	Incremental demand (by 1995)	Increment w/ own production	Azerbaijan	Kazakhstan	Russia (Timan-Pechora)	Iraq	Total	Deficit(-)/ Surplus(+)
2000	30,00	30,00	11,00	5,00	0,00	40,00	56,00	26,00
2005	54,00	84,00	44,00	5,00	18,00	60,00	127,00	43,00
2010	79,00	159,00	64,00	5,00	43,00	80,00	192,00	33,00
2015	109,00	239,00	52,00	5,00	16,00	80,00	153,00	-86,00
SUPPLIES TO ASIA								
	Incremental demand (by 1995)	Increment w own production	Azerbaijan	Kazakhstan	Russia (Sakhalin 1 and 2)	Iraq	Total	Deficit(-)/ Surplus(+)
2000	153,00	168,00	0,00	0,00	5,00	0,00	5,00	-163,00
2005	357,00	382,00	0,00	20,00	36,00	60,00	116,00	-266,00
2010	535,00	575,00	0,00	20,00	16,00	120,00	156,00	-419,00
2015	748,00	793,00	0,00	20,00	8,00	220,00	248,00	-545,00

Table 5-3.
Scenario 3 (CTC, Russia – supplies to Europe; Iraq, Azerbaijan – supplies to Asia)

<i>SUPPLIES TO EUROPE</i>								
	Incremental demand (by 1995)	Increment w/ own production	Azerbaijan	Kazakhstan	Russia (Timan-Pechora)	Iraq	Total	Deficit(-)/ Surplus(+)
2000	30,00	30,00	0,00	5,00	0,00	0,00	5,00	-25,00
2005	54,00	84,00	0,00	28,20	18,00	0,00	46,20	-3780
2010	79,00	159,00	0,00	38,00	43,00	0,00	81,00	-78,00
2015	109,00	239,00	0,00	67,00	16,00	0,00	83,00	-156,00
<i>SUPPLIES TO ASIA</i>								
	Incremental demand (by 1995)	Increment w/ own production	Azerbaijan	Kazakhstan	Russia (Sakhalin 1 and 2)	Iraq	Total	Deficit(-)/ Surplus(+)
2000	153,00	168,00	11,00	0,00	5,00	40,00	56,00	-112,00
2005	357,00	382,00	44,00	0,00	36,00	120,00	200,00	-182,00
2010	535,00	575,00	64,00	0,00	16,00	200,00	280,00	-295,00
2015	748,00	793,00	52,00	0,00	8,00	300,00	360,00	-433,00

Table 5-4.
Scenario 1.1 ("Western" with demand in the Black Sea Region)

SUPPLIES TO EUROPE									
	Incremental demand (by 1995)	Increment w/ own production	Azerbaijan	Kazakhstan	Russia (Timan-Pechora)	Iraq	Total	Total with demand in the Black Sea Region	Deficit(-)/ Surplus(+)
2000	30,00	30,00	11,00	5,00	0,00	40,00	56,00	39,00	9,00
2005	54,00	84,00	44,00	28,20	18,00	60,00	150,20	117,20	33,20
2010	79,00	159,00	64,00	38,00	43,00	80,00	225,00	192,00	33,00
2015	109,00	239,00	52,00	67,00	16,00	80,00	215,00	182,00	-57,00
SUPPLIES TO ASIA									
	Incremental demand (by 1995)	Increment w/ own production	Azerbaijan	Kazakhstan	Russia (Sakhalin 1 and 2)	Iraq	Total	Deficit(-)/ Surplus(+)	
2000	153,00	168,00	0,00	0,00	5,00	0,00	5,00	-163,00	
2005	357,00	382,00	0,00	0,00	36,00	60,00	96,00	-286,00	
2010	535,00	575,00	0,00	0,00	16,00	120,00	136,00	-439,00	
2015	748,00	793,00	0,00	0,00	8,00	220,00	228,00	-565,00	

Table 6-1.
Specific investments in the development of individual Caspian oil and gas projects according to the estimates of the
International Energy Agency (Azerbaijan)

Field (Project)	Development period (Peak production period), years	Peak production level, thousand barrels of oil equivalent per day	Capital investments (*) in development, \$ billion	Specific investments per unit of peak capacity, \$/barrel of oil equivalent of max. production per day
Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (AIOC)	1998-2028 (2010-2020)	800 (oil), 50 (gas)	13	16200
Karabakh (CIOC)	2003-2032 (2011-2020)	200 (oil)	1.5-3	7500-15000
Shah-Deniz	2003-2033 (2015-2025)	400 (oil), 100 (gas)	3-4	6000-8000
Dan Ulduzu – Ashrafi (SAOC)	2003-2033 (2010-2020)	140 (oil)	1.5-2.5	10700-17800
Lenkoran-Deniz and Talysh-Deniz	2006-2036 (2011-2020)	300 (oil)	1.5-2	5000-6700
Yalama (block D-222)	2002-2032 (2012-2016)	110 (oil)	2	18200
Oguz		60 (oil)	1.8	18000
Apsheron (Block D-2)	2005-2035 (2015-2025)	500 (oil), 330 (gas)	8	11000
Nakhichevan (block D-3)		180 (oil), 80 (gas)	2-2.5	11000-14000
Inam		200 (oil)	1.5-2.5	7500-12500
Yanan Tava-3, Atashgakh and Mugan Deniz		140 (oil)	2	14200
TOTAL (**)		3000 (oil), 700 (gas)	39.8-46.3	10700-12500 (average.)

AIOC - Azerbaijan International Operational Company

CIOC - Caspian International Oil Company

NAOC - North Apsheron Operational Company

(*) Aggregate investment, not disbounted, excluding operational expenses, bonuses, financing debt servicing, investments in social sphere and in pipelines.

(**) Including projects not listed in this table

Table 6-2.
Specific investments in the development of individual Caspian oil and gas projects according to the estimates of the International Energy Agency (Kazakhstan)

Field (Project)	Development period (Peak production period), years	Peak production level, thousand barrels of oil equivalent per day	Capital investments (*) in development, \$ billion.	Specific investments per unit of peak capacity, \$/barrel of oil equivalent of max. production per day
Tengizchevroil	1996-2036 (2010-2020)	1000 (oil), 500 (gas)	20-25	13300-16600
SKIOC	2004-2034 (2013-2023)	1200 (oil)	20-23	16600-19000
Karachaganak	1995-2035 (2003-2023)	300 (oil), 400 (gas)	7-10	10000-14300
Kazakturkmunai	1997-2027	600 (oil), 200 (gas)	6	7500
Japan GIT Oil	1998-2028	300 (oil)	3.87	12900
Uzenmunaigaz (CNPC)	1965-2010 (2000)	160-320 (oil)	1.2	3800-7500
Akhtubamunaigaz (CNPC)		100 (oil)	0.5	5000
JV Arman	1995-2025	100 (oil)	0.1	10000
JV Tulpanmurai		100 (oil)	2	10000
Mangistaumunaigazs	1980-2010 (2002-2006)	200 (oil)	2-4.1	10000-20000
TOTAL (**)		4200-4400 (oil), 1100 (gas)	64-79	12000-14300 (average)

SKIOC - Shelf Kazakh International Operational Company

CNPC - Chinese National Petroleum Company

(*) Aggregate investment, not disbounted, excluding operational expenses, bonuses, financing debt servicing, investments in social sphere and in pipelines.
(**) Including projects not listed in this table

Table 7.
Evolution of Investment Estimates for Certain Caspian Oil and Gas Projects, \$ billion

Date	AIOC Project (Azeri, Chirag and Guneshli Fields)	Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline
1994-1995	9-10	...
May 1995	...	2.0-2.5
August 1995	...	3.2-3.3
November 1997	12	4.0-4.5
April 1998	13	...

Sources: "Russian Petroleum Investor" (May 1995, August 1995), Komersant-daily (November 13, 1997), Nezavisimaya gazeta (November 20, 1997), [6] and others in appropriate years

Table 8-1.
Capital investments and transportation costs by different routes of supply of Azerbaijani oil to Western European market (Transneft company data)

Route	Pipeline length, thousand km	Volumes of oil supplies, million tons per year	Investments in pipelines, \$ billion	Transportation costs, \$ per ton (*)			
				Transport by pipeline	Shipment by sea	Loading/unloading and port fees	
						TOTAL	
1. Baku-Novorossiisk-Genoa (via Grozny)		5	0.10	19	5.6	-	24
		10	0.11	22	5.6	-	28
		30	1.04	25	5.6	-	31
2. Baku-Novorossiisk-Genoa (bypassing Chechnya)		5	0.32	31	5.6	-	37
		10	0.35	28	5.6	-	33
		30	0.99	26	5.6	-	31
3. Baku-Supsa-Genoa		5	0.41	34	7.9	4.5	46
		10	0.55	24	7.9	4.0	36
		30	1.70	21	7.9	3.5	32
4. Baku-Supsa-Burgas-Alexandropolis-Genoa		5	1.10	44	7.8	6.6	58
		10	1.24	34	7.8	6.1	48
		30	2.27	29	7.8	5.6	42
5. Baku-Ceyhan-Genoa		5	1.47	109	4.9	4.6	119
		10	1.90	71	4.9	4.6	80
		30	3.33	43	4.9	4.6	52
6. Baku-Kharg-Genoa		5	1.74	129	11	4.6	145
		10	2.15	80	11	4.6	96
		30	3.37	43	11	4.6	59
7. Baku-Supsa-Samsun-Ceyhan-Genoa (***)		5	1.32/1.27	102/98	8.8	10.1	121/117
		10	1.72/1.45	68/58	8.8	9.6	86/76
		30	3.57/3.14	45/39	8.8	9.1	63/57
8. Baku-Supsa-Odessa-Brody-Omishal-Genoa		5	1.13	52	8.7	14.5	75
		10	1.51	50	8.7	14.0	73
		30	3.72	48	8.7	13.5	70

(*) The pipeline tariff in Azerbaijani oil transportation routes is determined on the assumption that the credits are obtained at the average world interest rate of 8 percent and a maturity of 6 years.

(**) The denominator shows data for the shortest Samsun-Ceyhan route

Table 8-2.
Capital investments and transportation costs by different routes of supply of Kazakh oil to Western European market (Transneft company data)

Route	Pipeline length, thousand km	Volumes of oil supplies, million tons per year	Investments in pipelines, \$ billion.	Transportation costs, \$ per ton (*)			
				Transport by pipeline	Shipment by sea	Loading/unloading and port fees	
1-2. Tengiz-Atyrau-Komsomolsk-Roschino-Trudovaya-Tikhoretsk (or Kropotkin)-Novorossiisk (Yu. Ozerevka)-Genoa		10			5.6		25
3-4. Tengiz-Atyrau-Samara-Lisichansk-Tikhoretsk (or Kropotkin)-Yu. Ozerevka (CPC)-Genoa					5.6		26
8. Tengiz-Atyrau-Samara-Almetyevsk-Yaroslavl-Kirishi-Primorsk-Rotterdam		15			5.2		29
6. Tengiz-Atyrau-Samara-Gdansk (Poland)-Rotterdam		15			5.0		30
11. Tengiz-Atyrau-Komsomolskaya-Kropotkin-Yu. Ozerevka (CPC)-Genoa		36			5.6		31
7. Tengiz-Atyrau-Samara-Rostock (Germany)-Rotterdam		15			3.5		32
5. Tengiz-Atyrau-Samara-Adria (Omishal)-Genoa		15			3.9		36
9. Tengiz-Aktau-Baku-Supsa-Genoa		36			7.9		43
10. Tengiz-Aktau-Baku-Ceyhan-Genoa		36			4.9		50

Table 9.
Some technological and economic characteristics of pipeline construction projects for transportation of Caspian oil (US EIA data)

Route	Capacity, million tons per year*	Length, Thousand miles	Investment, \$ billion	Status
AIOC: Main export pipeline in the concept of "multiple routes of supply" from Baku	50	1100 – if to Ceyhan	3.3 – if to Ceyhan	Selection of final route
AIOC: Early oil – Western route Baku-Supsa	5	550	0.290	Supplies to begin in late 1998
AIOC: Early oil – Northern route Baku-Novorossiisk via Chechnya	5	868 (90 miles through Chechnya)	Cost of repairs of Chechnya section = 2.4	Supplies began in late 1997-early 1998
AIOC: Early oil – Northern route Baku-Novorossiisk bypassing Chechnya (portion from Russian-Azerbaijani border – Terskoye through Dagestan)	••	176	0.220	Announced 1997.;tender planned
CPC: Tengiz-Novorossiisk	67	930	2.2	Commissioning in 1999, maximum capacity early next century
Trans-Caspian pipeline (Tengiz-Baku or Turkmenbashi-Baku)	20-25	Underwater portion 370 or 190	2.5-3.0	Feasibility study
Kazakhstan-China (with possible extension to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan): Aktiubinsk-Xinjian	20 • ••••••••• •• 40	1800	3.5	Agreement signed
CAP (Turkmenistan-Afganistan-Pakistan, with possible extension to Uzbekistan): Chardzhou-Gvadar	50	1000	2.5	Protocol of intent for Central Asian portion
Turkmenistan-Persian Gulf (with possibl extension to Kazakhstan): Turkmenbashi-Kharg Island	10-20	930	1.5	Proposal

Table 10.

Main pros and contras of the three main routes for transportation of Azerbaijani oil to Europe according to Azerbaijan International Operation Consortium as presented by the Russian Petroleum Investor review.

Pipeline•	Pros	Contras
Baku-Ceyhan, 1500 km, \$3-3.5 billion	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Direct link between the Caspian terminal Sangachaly, Azerbaijan with terminal in Ceyhan, Turkey. 2. Project supported by Turkish and US Governments. 3. Supplies of Azerbaijani oil to Turkey via the shortest route. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Is not supported by Russia and thus will exacerbate the conflict about the legal status of the Caspian. 2. Vulnerable to acts of sabotage, possible interruption of supplies due to proximity of Azerbaijani-Armenian front and hotbeds of tension in the Kurd-populated Turkish territory. 3. Requires most investment.
Baku-Novorossiisk, 1411 km, \$2.3 billion	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Russian support removes obstacles for free passage of Azerbaijani vessels through the Volga-Don Canal connecting the Caspian with open seas. 2. Strengthens Azerbaijani positions in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (as Russia will have to adopt a neutral stance in the conflict and stop the support of the Armenian side) and in definition of Legal status of the Caspian Sea. 3. Requires relatively low investments 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Includes Tanker shipments via the overburdened Bosphorus straits. 2. Envisages mixing of Azerbaijani oil with lower-quality Russian crudes
Baku-Supsa, 926 km, \$1.2 billion.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Supplies Azerbaijani oil to world market without mixing it with other crudes. 2. Requires lowest investments. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Includes tanker shipments through overcrowded Turkish Black Sea straits. 2. Vulnerable to acts of aggression and sabotage by Abkhazian separatists and Georgian mafia. 3. Is not supported by Russia and thus will exacerbate the conflict about the legal status of the Caspian.

Source: "Russian Petroleum Investor", February 1998, p.28.

Table 11.
Consolidated technological and economic characteristics of pipeline construction projects
for transportation of Caspian oil to Europe and Asia
 (on the basis of Transneft data)

	Route	Investments, \$ million	Capacity, million tons per year	Tariff \$ per ton
1	Baku-Supsa	405	5	34
		550	10	24
		1700	30	21
2	Baku-Supsa-Burgas-Alexandropolis	1000	5	44
		1250	10	34
		2300	30	29
3	Baku-Novorossiisk	100	5	19
		115	10	22
		1000	30	25
4	Baku-Ceyhan	1500	5	110
		1900	10	70
		3300	30	42
5	Tengiz-Aktau-Baku-Supsa	2250	30	38
6	CPC (Tengiz-Novorossiisk)	2800	36	25
7	CAP (Tengiz-Pasni)	4450	42	44
8	Kazakhstan-Eastern China	10000	20	200-250
9	Baku-Persian Gulf (Khark Island)	1700	5	130
		2100	10	80
		3300	30	43

Table 12.
Estimated cost of transportation of Azerbaijani oil by certain routes
(James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University)

Route	Length, miles	Capacity, million tons per year •	Transportation cost, \$ per toon• (*)
Baku-Supsa	510	45 75	5.9 4.4
Baku-Ceyhan	1200	30 40	21.8 21.1
Samsun-Ceyhan	534	40 94	10.4 7.6

(*) assuming a 15 percent discount rate

For calculations' purposes it was assumed that 1 million barrels per day = 50 million toner per year, and a ton = 7.3 barrels.

Compiled on the basis of : Unlocking the Assets: Energy and the Future of Central Asia and the Caucasus. A Political, Economic, and Cultural Analysis. – Prepared in conjunction with an Energy Study sponsored by the Center for the International Political Economy and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy Rice University, April 1998

Table 13.**Hierarchy of directions of supply of Caspian oil by the levels of its "cutoff" prices**

Directions and routes of supply	Estimated cutoff price levels, \$ per ton
SUPPLIES TO EUROPE (c.i.f. Genoa)	
Azerbaijani oil:	
1. Baku-Novorossiisk	58
2. Baku-Supsa	59
3. Baku-Ceyhan	82
4. Baku-Kharg	90
Kazakh oil:	
1. CPC	60
SUPPLIES TO ASIA (c.i.f. Singapore)	
Azerbaijani oil:	
1. Baku-Kharg	89
Kazakh oil:	
1. CAP	94
SUPPLIES TO ASIA (China)	
Kazakh oil:	
1. North Eastern China	146
2. Substitution scheme with Russian crude	?

Table 14.
Estimated levels of aggregate investment demand for investment and transportation of Caspian oil and crude from competing Russian projects, \$ billion, main scenarios

Indicators	Scenario 1	CASPIAN	Scenario 2	Scenario 3
Production, total, including:				
- Azerbaijan	54.5		54.5	54.5
- Kazakhstan	26.5		26.5	26.5
Transportation, total, including:				
- Azerbaijan	28		28	28
- Kazakhstan	7.8		14.7	10.2
Production plus transportation, total, including:				
- Azerbaijan	5.1		5.1	7.5
- Kazakhstan	2.7		9.6	2.7
Production plus transportation, total,	62.3		69.2	64.7
including:				
- Azerbaijan	31.6		31.6	34
- Kazakhstan	30.7		37.6	30.7
		RUSSIA (New competing projects)		
Production	39		39	39
Transportation	3		3	3
Production plus transportation	42		42	42
		CASPIAN PLUS RUSSIA (New competing projects)		
Production	93.5		93.5	93.5
Transportation	10.8		17.7	13.2
Production plus transportation	104.3		111.2	106.7

Table 15.
Evolution of Russia's economic policy in the Caspian.

Approach, period	Government policy	Policy of oil companies
1. "Post-imperial approach", 1992-1995	Preventing Caspian states from starting to develop their hydrocarbon resources as it can result in Russia losing its influence in the region. Stake on power methods in resolution of regional problems. Foreign ministry views dominate.	Start of penetration of Russian companies (LUKoil) into the region. For the time being, their positions are too weak to exert any significant influence on the shaping of Russia's policy in the region).
2. "Pragmatic approach", 1995-1997	Abandoning power methods. Converging positions on disputed issues with neighboring states. Cessation of attempts to delay the development of Caspian fields. The goal of the foreign policy is to monopolize the routes of transportation of Caspian hydrocarbons to the world market, seeking to ensure their construction on Russian territory only. Strengthening positions of MinFuel holding the interests of Russian oil companies than the Foreign Ministry.	Expanding involvement of Russian oil companies in Caspian projects (Rosneft). Interested in alternative routes of delivery of Caspian oil to the market, including those through the territories of other countries, running contrary to the interests of the Government declared at that point. LUKoil and Gasprom claim the role of conduits of Russia's state policy in the Caspian.
3. "Integration approach", currently being shaped	Abandoning attempts to monopolize transportation routes of Caspian oil in favor of the most economically feasible routes. De facto recognition of division of the Caspian Sea into national sectors. Converging of Foreign Ministry and MinFuel positions to take into account the interests of Russian oil companies. The interests of companies begin to dominate in defining priorities in Government policies.	Further expansion of Russian companies' participation in Caspian projects (YUKOC, CTC). First attempts of other Russian companies to break the virtual monopoly of LUKoil in the region and its informal role of conduit of the state policy there.